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Abstract
We examine the eects of environmental policies such as a subsidy for
reforestation and an export-income tax in a small open economy with a re-
newable resource. In the small economy, the harvested renewable resources
are exported to acquire foreign assets and consumers can invest in the natural
resource to preserve it. In the setup, we show how the environmental policies
aect the natural resource and the domestic economy.
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1 Introduction
Some low-income nations are facing a shortage of natural resources such as forestry,
sh and wildlife stocks. Governments in most countries have become more aware
of such threats and the risk of natural resources depletion. However, there are no
stylized policies for preserving natural resources because government policies aect
not only natural resources but also other economic variables such as consumption
and investment. In this paper, we examine the eects of environmental policies on
renewable resources and on the domestic economy by using a small open economy
model.
The sustainability of major renewable resource stocks is a signicant issue in many
countries, especially developing countries. For instance, there have been widely publi-
cized claims that forests in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines
have been harvested rapidly, with deforestation shifting from the temperate zone to
the tropics following World War II. Other renewable resources, including sh and
wildlife stocks, are also under threat in many developing countries.
In these developing countries, most of the harvested resources are exported to
acquire foreign assets, which enable these countries to achieve rapid growth of their
economies. Repetto and Gillis (1988) mentioned that, by 1970, between 7 and 10
percent of the total forest area in Indonesia was being utilized to acquire foreign
assets, with the timber sector, specically logs and plywood, providing a major
source of foreign exchange. Indeed, between 1970 and 1979, gross foreign exchange
earnings from the export of tropical hardwood grew from US $ 110 million to US
$ 2.1 billion. Considering that gross domestic product in 1970 was about US $ 11
billion, the exports created by the deforestation were very valuable in Indonesia. In
the Philippines, the share of exports represented by logs and lumber in GDP rose
from about 9 percent in the late 1940s to about 15 percent by 1970. In 1970, 16.6
million hectares, or 55 percent of the country's land area, was made up of forests;
however, between 1971 and 1980, forest lands decreased by 1.7 million hectares. The
export of sh products in Iceland also contributed considerably to the nation's foreign
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currency earnings, with the contribution of the shing industry's exports to GDP at
around 17 percent in 1978 and 7 percent in 2007.1
In many developing countries, the overuse of natural resources is continuing, so
that preservation of these resources is still required. While some developing coun-
tries have introduced short-term environmental policies, some of these environmental
policies have generated unintended negative eects on the conservation of resources.
Two such environmental policies are regeneration policies, such as reforestation pol-
icy, and a specic income tax for harvesters.2 Repetto and Gillis (1988) focused
on the income tax policy in relation to logging investments in Indonesia and noted
that most timber companies had not paid income taxes at all from 1967 through to
1983. They concluded: More eective income taxation would not have reduced the
rate of exploitation of the tropical forest, but would have clearly raised the benets of
timber exploitation to the owner of the forest resource. In addition, some researchers
have examined the eects of reforestation. In Indonesia, from 1946 through to 1983,
reforestation programs impacted on 2.3 million hectares of land. To examine the im-
pacts of the subsidy on reforestation in Indonesia, Osgood (1994) made use of panel
data on 20 regions in Indonesia from 1972 to 1988. Interestingly, she concluded that
the reforestation subsidy encouraged further deforestation. In addition, Repetto and
Gillis (1988) examined reforestation policies in Malaysia and the Philippines and
found that 21,000 hectares were replanted between 1974 and 1981 in Malaysia, while
more than 78,000 hectares had been reforested between 1976 and 1983 in the Philip-
pines. Shen and Contreras-Hermosilla (1995) noted that, in India, during 1985{89,
the total number of seedlings distributed under the farm forestry program was in the
order of 1.4{2.0 billion a year, which was enough to plant 560,000{800,000 hectares.
1See the homepage of the Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture's Icelandic Fisheries
Information Centre at: http://www.sheries.is/iceland/
2Further, Repetto and Gillis (1988) showed that a policy that bans the export of logs in Indonesia
has not necessarily promoted better forest conservation. Shen and Contreras-Hermosilla (1995)
mentioned that the logging ban in Thailand had a limited eect on reducing the rate of deforestation,
and instead may have caused illegal trade to increase.
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Repetto and Gillis (1988) and Shen and Contreras-Hermosilla (1995) concluded that
the subsidized forestation policies provided little or no incentive to plant trees so
that the reforestation policies aimed at regeneration have proved largely ineective.
In the resource-dependent developing countries, environmental policies have a
large impact not only on these countries' natural resource sectors but also on their
whole economies. Hence, in this paper, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium
model of a small open economy with a renewable resource. The small economy in
our model has the following characteristics. The renewable resource is harvested to
produce exportable commodities, which are exported to acquire the foreign assets.
In addition, people can invest in the natural resource such as tree planting or sh
replenishment to avoid its depletion. Under this set-up, our focus is to examine the
dynamic impact of temporary environmental policy changes on the resource as well as
on the domestic economy because environmental policies are temporarily performed
in actual economies such as Indonesia and Malaysia. To shed light on eects of
such temporary policy changes, we compare them with eects of permanent policy
changes. Specically, a government can use two policy instruments; a subsidy policy
for reforestation and an income tax policy against the harvesters. Our main nding is
the following: Permanent increases of these policy instruments can increase the level
of the natural resource; instead, temporary increases of these policy instruments
always decrease the level of the natural resource in the long run compared to its
original level, although the level of the natural resource increases in the short run.
Our study is closely related to some of the existing investigations in the envi-
ronmental dynamic models with renewable resources and the international macro-
dynamic models (e.g., Elasson and Turnovsky, 2004., Fullerton and Kim, 2008 and
Silva et al. 2013).3 Many environmental studies incorporate renewable natural re-
3Concretely, Elasson and Turnovsky (2004) construct an endogenous growth model with a
renewable resource to examine the eects of an increase in the productivity of the harvest sector
and the nal output sector. Fullerton and Kim (2008) show that pollution tax revenues are not
enough to pay for optimal public spending on abatement in the macrodynamic model with the
renewable resource. Silva et al (2013) construct a more general equilibrium model with renewable
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sources into macrodynamic models; however, these existing studies do not focus on
the temporary eect of environmental policies in a small open economy. Further-
more, even if the temporary policies are conducted in their closed economies, the
economy would go back to the original steady state after the policy variables re-
turn to its original levels. As a result, the temporary environmental policies are not
harmful for the natural resource in the long run.
Alternatively, the structure of our model is the same as Sen and Turnovsky (1989),
Turnovsky (1997) and Schubert and Turnovsky (2002) in the sense that when policy
temporarily changes under the assumption of perfect foresight, the small open econ-
omy does not return to its original steady-state equilibrium after the policy variables
returns to its original levels. This insight on public policies is completely dierent
from the result of the closed macrodynamic models that the long-run equilibrium
coincides with the original steady state under temporary policy changes. However,
the existing studies do not include the natural resource sector in each model and fur-
thermore, their attention is not to examine the temporary eects of environmental
policies.
Finally, our motivation is closely related to that in Rondeau and Bulte (2007) in
the point that both the studies cast some doubts about the usefulness of environ-
mental protection policies. Rondeau and Bulte (2007) make use of a single-country
partial equilibrium model with the interaction between habitat and open-access re-
source in Bulte and Horan (2003). They show that compensation schemes aimed at
reducing hunting mortality can actually decrease the wildlife stock. This is because
compensation distorts relative commodity prices, thereby being able to increase the
returns to agriculture and encourage agricultural expansion. Instead, we use a dy-
namic macroeconomic model where the natural resource sector is newly introduced,
especially, the harvested renewable resource is used to obtain the foreign assets.
The essential cause that the environmental policies may be harmful for the natu-
ral resource lies in the implementation term of environmental policies in our model.
and non-renewable resources to analyze the eects of the emission tax on the economy.
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That is, the natural resource may be harmed by the temporary implementation of
environmental policies, not the permanent one.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present the model. Section 3 shows the existence and uniqueness of the steady state.
Section 4 examines the eects of government policies on the economy. Section 5 gives
discussion. Our conclusions are summarized in Section 6.
2 The basic framework
This section presents a small open economy model with a renewable resource. The
population is constant over time and its size is normalized to be unity. This economy
consists of rms and a government as well as households.
2.1 The evolution of the renewable resource
The economy is endowed with a stock of a renewable resource nt, where t stands
for time. We assume that the reproduction of the renewable natural resource is
characterized according to G(nt). The reproduction function G(nt) has an inverted
U-shape, with G00 < 0 and G(0) = G(n) = 0, where n represents the carrying capacity
of the natural resource.4 This means that there is a level ~n that satises G0(~n) = 0.
In other words, ~n expresses the level of the renewable resource that provides the
maximum sustained yield. If the level of the natural resource is below the level
of ~n, then the marginal reproduction of the natural resource takes positive values,
whereas if it exceeds ~n, the marginal reproduction of the natural resource takes
negative values.5 In addition, we assume that, as the level of the natural resource
4For example, in an economy with a renewable resource, Schaefer (1954), Bovenberg and
Smulders (1996), Brander and Taylor (1998), Ayong Le Kama (2001), Wirl (2004), Elasson and
Turnovsky (2004), and Lopez et al.(2007) made use of a reproduction function with a U-shape.
5Due to the concavity of G(nt), it is recognized that analysis of the stability is more complicated.
For instance, see Fullerton and Kim (2008).
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approaches innity, the change rate of the natural resource is given by G(1) =  1.6
The households can invest in reproduction of the natural resource.7 Thus, we assume
that the renewable resource held by a household evolves as follows:
_nt =  (at) +G(nt)  zt; (1)
where  () represents the investment function for the natural resource, at is the in-
vestment in the natural resource, and zt is the harvested level of the natural resource
for use as an input into production.8 The investment function  (at) : <+ ! <+ is as-
sumed to be twice continuously dierentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave
with respect to the investment at; furthermore, it satises the Inada conditions.
9
2.2 The household and the rms
We describe the representative household's preference as follows. The household
obtains utility from consumption and from the natural resource. In particular, we
assume that the household becomes happier as the quantity of the natural resource
6Following a lot of existing papers (e.g., Brander and Taylor 1997, and Elasson and Turnovsky
2004), the following reproduction function satises the assumption:
G(nt) =  nt

1  nt
n

;
where  is the intrinsic rate of growth of the resource. We will make use of this reproduction
function in numerical examples.
7As for the investment at, Lopez et al. (2007) commented that investments in natural resources
comprise tree planting, sh replenishment including aquaculture investments, protection or cleanup
of ecosystems, soil protection including terracing drainage, and agricultural fallowing.
8Unlike our model, the harvest of the natural resource is carried out according to the Schaefer
harvesting function in some papers (e.g., Brander and Taylor 1998a and 1998b).
9Some studies introduce the natural resource sector including the investment in the natural
resource by households (e.g., Hoagland et al., 2003 and Lopez et al., 2007). Lopez et al. (2007)
assume that households can invest in the natural resource as in the current setting. Hoagland et al
(2003) consider a more complicated natural resource sector, that is, the investment in the natural
resource by households indirectly increases the size of the natural sh stock through the expansion
of the area devoted to aquaculture.
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increases. For instance, we suppose that people feel happier when the number of
sh in own sea increases or when the number of trees in own forests and mountains
increases. In addition, the used preference follows Economides and Philippopoulos
(2008). In this economy, there are two nal goods: one is produced by physical capital
and labor according to the neoclassical production function per capita, f(k), where k
stands for the capital stock per capita; the other is produced by harvesting the natural
resource according to the production function h(zt). The production function h()
is strictly increasing, twice dierentiable, and concave with respect to the harvested
natural resource; furthermore, it satises the Inada conditions. We assume that all of
the goods produced by the harvested renewable resource are exported. That is, the
household does not consume the goods produced by the harvested natural resource.10
Then, the preference of the household is expressed as follows:
U [0] =
Z 1
0
[u(ct) + v(nt)]e
 tdt; (2)
where u() and v() represent the instantaneous utility functions of private consump-
tion ct and the natural resource nt, respectively, and  is the xed rate of time
preference. The instantaneous utility functions, u() and v(), are twice continu-
ously dierentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in terms of ct, and nt,
respectively. In addition, these functions satisfy the Inada conditions.
In the small open economy, the world interest rate, r, is assumed to be constant.
As prot maximization of the rms ensures that r = f 0(k), the domestic capital stock
takes a constant value, k, and the wage rate also becomes constant, w = f(k) kf 0(k).
By making use of the goods produced by the capital stock, the household has
the option of either consuming the goods or investing in reproduction of the natural
10When the household consumes the export commodities, the preference is written as follows:
U [0] =
Z 1
0
[u(ct) + v(nt) + !(export goods)]e
 tdt;
where !() represents the utility function of export goods consumption. Because the relative price
of consumption commodities is exogenously given in a small open economy, this generalization does
not change the essence of main nding obtained in this model.
8
resource. Then, the accumulation of the foreign asset, bt is expressed as follows:
_bt = rbt + f(k) + (1   y)ph(zt)  ct   (1  a)at   Z; (3)
where Z is the lump-sum transfer. Moreover, p shows the relative price of the
exported good, measured by the price of the consumption good, which is exogenously
given because of the set-up in the small open economy.
In the accumulation equation for the foreign asset (3), we consider two types
of environmental policies. First, a represents the constant rate of the investment
subsidy. An increase in a implies that the relative price of the investment in the
natural resource decreases, which would further stimulate the investment. As the
level of the natural resource is improved, the investment subsidy policy would be
regarded as a regeneration policy such as a reforestation policy. Second,  y shows
the constant income tax rate imposed only on the exportable income. It is likely
to be one of the environmental protection policies targeting forest-based industry
(or sheries) because, when the rate of the export-income tax increases, the level
of the harvested natural resource would decrease, which could protect the natural
resource.11
Finally, the government is assumed to keep the following balanced budget:
Z = aat    yph(zt): (4)
Note that when Z > 0, the government imposes a lump-sum tax, whereas when
Z < 0, the government makes transfers.
The representative household maximizes its lifelong utility (2) subject to the
evolution of the renewable resource (1) and the budget constraint (3). To solve the
maximization problem, we constitute the current value Hamiltonian as follows:
H  u(ct)+v(nt)+qt frbt + f(k) + (1   y)ph(zt)  ct   (1  a)at   Zg+t f (at) +G(nt)  ztg ;
(5)
11Because we assume a small open economy, the result is the same even if the income tax is
imposed not only on the export income but also on the rest of the income.
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where t is the shadow value for the natural resource associated with (1) and qt is
the shadow value for the foreign assets associated with (3).
The rst order conditions are:12
u0(ct) = qt; (6a)
(1   y)qtph0(zt) = t; (6b)
 0(at)t = (1  a)qt; (6c)
r    =   _qt
qt
; (6d)
v0(nt)
t
+G0(nt)   =   _t
t
: (6e)
Finally, the transversality conditions for the foreign asset and the natural resource
are:
lim
t!1
qtbte
 t = 0; and lim
t!1
tnte
 t = 0: (6f)
2.3 Equilibrium dynamics
This subsection characterizes the equilibrium paths. Let us dene a competitive
equilibrium as follows.
Denition. A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocation, fct; bt; nt; zt; at; ktg1t=0,
such that, given the initial conditions b0, k0, and n0, and a set of prices fw, r, pg, the
representative household's utility is maximized, the rm's prots are maximized, the
governmental budget constraint is balanced every time, and all markets are cleared.
12A considerable number of existing papers assume that private agents do not take the motion of
natural resources into account when optimizing their choices. Instead, to focus on the temporary
impact of the environmental policies, we assume that there is no environmental externality; however,
we conrmed that the main result in Proposition 2 is not changed even if the reproduction of the
renewable resource, G(nt) is used for the externality and is not internalized.
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We now turn to deriving the dynamic equations of this economy. First, from
equations (6a) and (6d), we obtain:13
_ct
ct
=   u
0(ct)
ctu00(ct)
(r   ): (7)
Assuming that r =  in the small open economy, the level of consumption is constant
over time. Hereafter, we omit the subscript t from consumption, and denote the
constant level of consumption by c.
Next, solving (6c) for t and substituting (6a) into it, we obtain the shadow price
for the natural resource:
t =
(1  a)u0(c)
 0(at)
: (8)
Dierentiating (8) with respect to time and substituting this equation into (6e), we
obtain:
_at
at
=    
0(at)
at 00(at)

r  G0(nt)  v
0(nt) 0(at)
(1  a)u0(c)

 F (nt; at; ct; a); (9)
where we note that r = .
From equations (6b) and (6c), we obtain:
ph0(zt) =
1  a
(1   y) 0(at) : (10)
Solving (10) for the harvested resource zt yields:
zt = z(at; 
a;  y); (11a)
where the derivatives are given by:
@zt
@at
=   
00(at)h0(zt)
 0(at)h00(zt)
< 0;
@zt
@a
=   h
0(zt)
(1  a)h00(zt) > 0; and
@zt
@ y
=
h0(zt)
(1   y)h00(zt) < 0:
Furthermore, because the functions h(zt) and  (at) satisfy the Inada conditions,
z(at; 
a;  y) has the following characteristics:
lim
at!0
z(at; 
a;  y) =1; and lim
at!1
z(at; 
a;  y) = 0: (11b)
13The additive separability of utility function is critical for the movement of consumption; there-
fore, in Section 5 we make use of the non-separable utility function so that the level of consumption
is not constant over time.
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Substituting equation (11a) into the evolution of the natural resource (1), we
obtain the dynamic equation of the natural resource as follows:
_nt =  (at) +G(nt)  z(at; a;  y)  H(nt; at; a;  y): (12)
Equations (9) and (12) constitute the dynamic system for (at; nt) of the small open
economy, given a steady-state level of consumption and the rates of the investment
subsidy and the export-income tax.
3 Steady-state equilibrium
This section analyzes the existence and the stability of the steady-state equilibrium.14
With the rate of time preference and the interest rate both being exogenously given
constants in the small open economy, we require r =  for our system to have a
nite interior steady-state value for the marginal utility of consumption. Under the
assumption, the level of consumption is constant over time as seen in (7).
Let us assume that an asterisk indicates the steady-state levels of the variables.
Taking account of F (n; a; c; a) = 0 and H(n; a;  a;  y) = 0 in the steady state,
given consumption and the environmental policies we draw the phase diagram.
At rst, we consider the shape of the _at = 0 locus. In this case, the slope of the
_at = 0 locus is:
dat
dnt

_at=0
=  Fn
Fa
(< 0); (13)
where the respective derivatives are:15
Fn =
 0(a)
 00(a)

G00(n) +
v00(n)(r  G0(n))
v0(n)

(> 0); Fa = r  G0(n)(> 0):
In addition, as the level of the natural resource approaches innity (zero), the level
14As Fullerton and Kim (2008) point out, stability analysis of the steady state is complicated due
to the concavity of the reproduction function G(nt).
15As shown later, it always holds that r > G0 in the steady state.
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of the investment in the natural resource approaches zero (innity).16 As depicted
in Figure 1, _at > (<)0 in region above (under) the _at = 0 locus.
[ Figure 1 around here ]
Next, making use of H(n; a; a;  y) = 0, we can depict the _nt = 0 locus as the
U-shaped curve in Figure 1. This is because, by totally dierentiating (23b), given
c, a, and  y, we obtain:
dat
dnt

_nt=0
=
Hn
Ha
: (14)
where
Hn = G
0(n); Ha =  0(a)  @z()
@a
(> 0):
That is, it can be shown that the _nt = 0 locus has the negative (positive) slope if
G0(n) < (>)0. Furthermore, because G(0) = 0 as the level of the natural resource
approaches zero, the level of the investment in the natural resource approaches a
nite level, which satises z(a;  a;  y) =  (a). Instead, because G(1) =  1 as
the level of the natural resource goes to innity, the level of the investment in the
natural resource approaches innity. It can be conrmed that _nt > (<)0 in the region
above (under) the _nt = 0 locus.
Linearization of the dynamic equations (9) and (12) around the steady state
yields: 0@ _at
_nt
1A =
0@Fa Fn
Ha Hn
1A0@at   a
nt   n
1A M
0@at   a
nt   n
1A : (15)
The trace and the determinant of this system are given by:
Tr(M)  Fa +Hn = r(> 0); (16a)
Det(M)  FaHn   FnHa = FaHa

Hn
Ha
  Fn
Fa

: (16b)
Because our dynamic system involves one jumpable variable, at, and one predeter-
mined variable, nt, the economy has a saddlepoint property around the steady-state
16As conrmed later, the equation (9) in the steady state is given by r G
0(n)
 0(a) =
v0(n)
(1 a)u0(c)
where we assume that r > G0(0). Because the level of consumption is constant, we can conrm
that n !1 as a ! 0 and n ! 0 as a !1.
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equilibrium if the sign of the determinant is negative. We can obtain the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. When ~n < n, the economy satises the saddle-path stability. Instead,
when ~n > n, the steady state satises locally determinacy if the following inequality
is satised.
Hn
Ha
<
Fn
Fa
; (17)
Proof. Suppose that ~n < n so that Hn < 0. In this case, from (16b) the sign of
determinant is negative, showing that the steady state has a saddlepoint stability.
Next, consider that ~n > n such that Hn > 0. Using the condition (18), the deter-
minant has the negative sign. We assume that this inequality holds in the following
analysis. 
From (13) and (14), the condition (18) states that the slope of the _at = 0 locus
is steeper than that of the _nt = 0 locus at the steady state. It is depicted that the
dotted curve represented by the _at = 0 locus crosses the _nt = 0 as shown in Figure
1. Specially, substituting each terms into this inequality, we can show that
r <
v0(n) 0(a)
(1  a)u0(c) +
v00(n) 0(a)
v0(n) 00(a)

 0(a)  @z()
@a

: (18)
From Lemma 1, the system has one stable root and one unstable root. We denote
these eigenvalues as 1 < 0 and 2 > 0. These eigenvalues are:
1  Tr(M) 
p
(Tr(M))2   4Det(M)
2
< 0; 2  Tr(M) +
p
(Tr(M))2   4Det(M)
2
> 0:
(19)
Thus, the solution of the linearized system can be written as follows:
nt = n
 +D1e1t +D2e2t; (20a)
at = a
 +D11e1t +D22e2t; (20b)
where the entities of the eigenvectors, s (s = 1; 2), are given by:
1   
0(a)
 00(a)
 
G00(n) + v
00(n)(r G0(n))
v0(n)
1 +G0(n)  r
!
< 0; and 2   
0(a)
 00(a)
 
G00(n) + v
00(n)(r G0(n))
v0(n)
2 +G0(n)  r
!
:
14
Note that 1 < 0 and 2 >  = r. Because of the transversality condition, it must
hold that D2 = 0. From (20a), we can show that D1 = n0   n. Thus, the stable
adjustment path is given by:
nt = n
 + (n0   n)e1t; (21a)
at = a
 +1(n0   n)e1t: (21b)
Next, let us derive the intertemporal solvency condition for this economy. Sub-
stituting (11a) into (3) yields:
_bt = rbt + f(k) + (1   y)ph(zt(at; a;  y))  c  (1  a)at   Z: (22a)
Linearizing the budget constraint (22a) around the steady state under the balanced
budget of the government (4) yields:
_bt =

ph0(z)
@z(a; a;  y)
@a
  1

(at   a) + r(bt   b): (22b)
Substituting (21a) and (21b) into (22b), we obtain the linearized solution of bt for an
initial stock of the foreign asset b0.
bt = b
 + fb0   b + (n0   n)
11g ert   (n0   n)
11e1t; (22c)
where 
1 is given by:

1 
ph0(z)@z
()
@a   1
  1 < 0:
Because of the intertemporal solvency condition of the economy, the following
equality must hold:
b0   b =  
11(n0   n): (22d)
Then, we obtain the stable path for bt as follows:
bt = b
   
11(n0   n)e1t: (22e)
Note that because both 
1 and 1 take negative values, the level of the foreign asset
moves in the opposite direction to the level of the natural resource along the stable
path.
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Finally, in order to express the steady-state equilibrium, we consider the economy
starting at time Tj and corresponding to a policy set 
a
j and 
y
j . Moreover, the viable
steady state is associated with the initial levels of the natural resource and the foreign
asset nTj and bTj , respectively, at time Tj. Taking account of _nt = _at =
_bt = 0 with
the intertemporal solvency condition, a viable steady state j given by aj and 
y
j , (c

j ,
aj , n

j , b

j) is determined as follows:
r  G0(nj)
v0(nj) 0(a

j)
=
1
(1  aj )u0(cj)
; (23a)
G(nj) = z(a

j ; 
a
j ; 
y
j )   (aj); (23b)
rbj + f(k) + ph(zj(a

j ; 
a
j ; 
y
j )) = c

j + a

j ; (23c)
bTj   bj =  
11(nTj   nj): (23d)
4 The eects of government policy
In this section, we analyze how policy changes aect the economy. It is well known
that in a closed economy, a temporary policy change inuences the economy but,
once the policy is removed, the system gradually returns to the original steady-state
equilibrium. However, in small open economy models such as the present analysis, it
is shown that the economy does not return to its original steady-state equilibrium.17
Our main result is that when the rate of investment subsidy or the export-income
tax temporarily increases, the level of the natural resource in the new steady-state
equilibrium always decreases relative to its original level.
Suppose that the economy is initially in the steady-state equilibrium in which
aj = 
a
0 and 
y
j = 
y
0 . We denote this original steady state with the subscript 0:
n0 = n

0 = N(c

0; 
a
0 ; 
y
0 ); Nc > 0; Na > 0; Ny > 0: (24a)
a0 = a

0 = A(c

0; 
a
0 ; 
y
0 ); Ac > (<)0 ifG
0 < (>)0; Aa > 0 ifG0 < 0; Ay < 0 ifG0 > 0:
(24b)
17See, for example, Turnovsky (1997) and Schubert and Turnovsky (2002).
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b0 = b

0 = B(c

0; 
a
0 ; 
y
0 ); (24c)
c0 = c

0 = C(
a
0 ; 
y
0 ; b0; n0); Ca < 0; Cy < 0; CbT > 0; CbT > 0: (24d)
Here, we assume the following condition to obtain the signs of the derivative (24d):18
r <
v0(n) 0(a)
(1  a)u0(c) +
r

 0(a)  @z()
@a

(r  G0(n)  1)(r   1)
 0(a)
 00(a)

v00(n)
v0(n)
+G00(n)

: (25)
Note that this condition (25) corresponds to the stability condition (18) when 1
approaches zero. Furthermore, as r(r G
0(n))
(r 1)(r 1 G0(n)) < 1, this condition is stricter
than (18).
4.1 Permanent eects
In this subsection, we examine the eects of permanent changes in environmental
policies on the natural resource in the long run. Conducting a comparative statics
analysis, we obtain the following.
Proposition 1. A permanent increase in the rate of the investment subsidy increases
(decreases) the steady-state level of the natural resource if the following inequality is
satised:
a
1  a < (>)

1

  1

c
ph(z)
;
1

  1    h
00h
(h0)2
(> 0);    u
00(c)c
u0(c)
(> 0) (26)
where 0 <  < 1 and  > 0:
A permanent increase in the rate of the export-income tax increases (decreases)
the steady-state level of the natural resource if the following inequality is satised:
 y
1   y < (>)
1  

 c

a
; 1      
00a
 0
(> 0) (27)
Proof. See Appendix B. 
18Using the following procedure, we derive the equations (24a)   (24d), where Tj = 0. From
(23a) and (23b), we obtain (24a) and (24b). Furthermore, substituting (24b) into (23c) yields (24c).
Finally, incorporating (24c) into (23d), we obtain (24d). We derive the equations explicitly in
Appendix A.
17
We now explain the intuition behind this proposition.19 Figures 2 and 3 illustrate
the eects of the investment subsidy and the export-income tax, respectively. Note
that Tem (or Per) in these gures show the cases that the environmental policies
change temporarily (or permanently).
First, we examine the eects of the investment subsidy policy where E0 is the
original steady state. By using the equation (23a), we can show how the downward
sloping _at = 0 locus moves as a result of the permanent increase in the rate of
investment subsidy:
@aj
@aj

_at=0; nj=constant
=
aj
1  
0BBB@Cacj| {z }
#1
+
1
1  a| {z }
#2
1CCCA : (28a)
Note that Ca has a negative sign, which represents the negative impact of the
investment subsidy policy on private consumption; that is, the decrease in the cost of
the investment due to the investment subsidy reduces the demand for consumption
goods.20 The equation (28a) consists of the indirect eect that occurs through a
change in consumption, given by the term #1, and the direct eect, given by the
term #2. The term #1 takes a negative value and the term #2 takes a positive
value. Therefore, if the eect of the term #2 dominates the term #1, the _at = 0
locus moves upward. Figure 2 shows this case.
19Since the conditions (26) and (27) are complicated, it would be hard for readers to understand
the values given in (26) and (27). To help the understanding of readers, we now use some specic
functional forms and parameter values in numerical examples of Section 5.1:  =  = 0:5, p = 1:25
and  = 1:75 so that p ' 2:2 and 1  ' 0:29: As a result, each condition is given by:
(26):
a
1  a < (>)
c
2:2h(z)
; (27):
y
1  y < (>)
c
0:29a
If the rate of investment subsidy or export-income tax is small enough, then we can show that the
permanent increase in each rate increases the level of natural resource in the long run. In particular,
the numerical examples will give the case where the permanent increase in the rate of investment
subsidy or export-income tax, from a0 = 0 (or 
y
0 = 0) to 
a
1 = 0:2 (or 
y
1 = 0:2) leads to the larger
level of natural resource as in Figures 2 and 3.
20See the equation (A:9a) in Appendix A.
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On the other hand, the permanent increase in the rate of the investment subsidy
always shifts the _nt = 0 locus upward:
@aj
@aj

_nt=0; nj=constant
=
@z()
@aj
 0(aj)  @z()@aj
(> 0): (28b)
Taking account of (28a) and (28b), as the _nt = 0 locus shifts upward, the extent of
the change of the _at = 0 locus determines the direction of the impact on the natural
resource. When  and a take suciently small values, then the eect of the term
#1 relatively becomes weak and, thus, the _at = 0 locus moves upward, as shown
by Figure 2. Indeed, when  and a take suciently small values, the level of the
natural resource increases. In contrast, when  and a take suciently large values,
then the eect of the term #1 relatively becomes strong and, thus, the _at = 0 locus
moves downward. This decreases the level of the natural resource.
Moreover, we characterize changes in the foreign asset over time. From (23d),
when the level of the natural resource in the new steady-state equilibrium is greater
than that in the initial period, the level of the foreign asset in the steady-state
equilibrium is smaller than that in the initial period and vice versa. That is, if
nj > (<)n

0 under a policy set 
a
j and 
y
j , it always holds that b

j < (>)b

0. This
negative relationship between the foreign asset and the natural resource is depicted
in Figure 2(b).21 As a result, Figure 2(b) shows that an increase in the rate of
the investment subsidy decreases the level of the foreign asset from b0 to b

1 where
n1 > n

0. This is because the increase in the investment, as a result of the subsidy,
decreases exports and, thus, the level of the foreign asset.22
Second, we examine the eect of a permanent increase in the rate of the export-
income tax on the natural resource in Figure 3. Unlike the case of the investment
21The negative relationship also applies to the case of the export-income tax rate, as shown in
Figure 3(b).
22Instead, suppose that the _at = 0 locus moves downward where the _nt = 0 locus always moves
upward. In this case, the level of the natural resource decreases over time as a result of the
permanent increase in the rate of the investment subsidy. However, we omit this case to focus on
the interesting case.
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subsidy policy, there is no direct eect on the _at = 0 locus produced by the export-
income tax. Thus, any permanent increase in the rate of the export-income tax
moves the _at = 0 locus downward:
@aj
@ yj

_at=0; nj=constant
=
ajCy
(1  )cj
< 0: (29a)
On the other hand, the _nt = 0 locus moves downward:
@aj
@aj

_nt=0; nj=constant
=
@z()
@yj
 0(aj)  @z()@aj
(< 0): (29b)
From (29a), the downward shift of the _at = 0 locus is smaller as the values of 
and  are smaller. Then, a permanent increase in the rate of the export-income tax
increases the level of the natural resource. As Figure 3(a) shows, after the investment
in the natural resource initially jumps from E0 to I, the level of the natural resource
increases toward the new steady state, E1.
23 In this case, from (23d), the level of the
foreign asset decreases from E0 to E1 in Figure 3(b).
4.2 Temporary eects
In the previous subsection, we examined the impacts of the permanent environmental
policies on the natural resource. However, where environmental policies have been
applied in practice, such as in Indonesia and Malaysia, all environmental policies
have been implemented temporarily. As a result, it is more important to investigate
the eects of temporary changes of the environmental policies on the natural resource
over time, as well as the long-run eects.
In the present model, as conrmed in (7), the consumption growth rate is zero;
that is, after the initial jump of consumption, the level of consumption is constant
over time as long as the given conditions do not unanticipatedly change. When the
government announces the initial changes of the policy instruments from the original
23Because the _at = 0 and _nt = 0 loci move downward in the initial period, it can be easily
conrmed that the initial jump of the investment in the natural resource is always downward, as
conrmed in Figure 3(a).
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levels to new levels, the household in the small economy changes its consumption
behavior only at the initial time. In the case of temporary policy changes, after some
duration, [0; T ], has passed, the policy instruments permanently return to the original
level. However, under the assumption of perfect foresight, the level of consumption
does not go back to its original level after its initial jump because the household
can initially anticipate the policy change at time T ; that is, the consumption level
stays there permanently so as to sustain the intertemporal solvency condition. As
a result, the temporary policy changes have long-run impacts on the level of the
natural resource.
The eects of the temporary environmental policies on the natural resource can
be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2. The temporary increase in the rate of investment subsidy or the
export-income tax always lowers the level of the natural resource in the long run.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Let us explain the intuition of this proposition why the temporary policies de-
crease the level of the natural resource in the long run. The key element is the
direction of the initial jump in consumption, showing that both policies have neg-
ative impact on consumption in the initial period. In detail, in the case of the
investment subsidy policy, the increase in the relative price of consumption com-
modity compared with the investment in the natural resource lowers the demand in
consumption, whereas in the case of the export-income tax, the decrease in income
lowers that. As a result, the initial jump of consumption is downwards and thereafter
the consumption stays there in the long run.24
Remembering that the level of consumption decreases due to these policies, let
us suppose that the economy initially stays at the steady-state equilibrium. Sup-
pose further that government unanticipatedly raises the rate of investment subsidy
or export-income tax at the initial time, leading to the decrease in consumption at
24The negative relation between these policies and consumption is shown by (A:9a) and (A:9b)
in Appendix A.
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the initial period. When only the negative impact on consumption is considered,
equation (9) states that the investment growth rate becomes positive. Namely, the
current investment is substituted with the future investment, which delays the in-
vestment in the natural resource such as the tree planting. Consequently, because
only the negative impact of consumption stays in the long run after the temporary
environmental policy is completed, the level of the natural resource decreases relative
to the original level.
Finally, we want to conrm the whole economy's evolution by using the phase
diagram. At rst, we consider the case of investment subsidy policy. We can show
how the _nt = 0 and the _at = 0 loci move when the rate of investment subsidy
increases. Using (28b), we can show that the _nt = 0 locus moves upward to _nt =
0 (t < T ) and then returns to its original position if the rate of the investment subsidy
policy returns to its original level. From (28a), if the indirect impact is dominated by
the direct eect, the _at = 0 locus moves upward to _at = 0 (t < T ) at the initial time
as shown in Figure 2(a). However, even if the government returns the investment
subsidy to its original level, the _at = 0 locus does not go back to its original position
because the level of consumption remains constant after the initial jump. Therefore,
the indirect impact of the investment subsidy shown by #1 in (28a) remains even
after the government policy is removed. This indicates that the _at = 0 locus moves
downward relative to its original position in the long run, as shown in Figure 2(a).
When an increase in the investment subsidy is temporary, the upward jump of
the investment in the natural resource is smaller than the jump when the policy
change is permanent. That is, the economy jumps from E0 to I
0 at the initial time
(see Figure 2(a)).25 After the jump, the level of the natural resource increases toward
25The size of the initial jump is aected by the expected duration of the temporary policy. For
instance, when the duration of the policy change is short, the initial jump of investment in the
natural resource can be below the level of a^. In this case, the level of the natural resource decreases
along an unstable path; when the rate of investment subsidy returns to the original level at time T ,
the level of the natural resource further decreases along a stable path as in Figure 2(a). However,
we omit this case to focus on the interesting case. Alternatively, if the initial point of jump I 0 were
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I 00 along the unstable path. When the economy reaches I 00, the level of the natural
resource begins to decrease; the economy is still on the unstable path. The economy
reaches I 000 when the government returns to the original policy at time T . After this
policy reversion, the economy follows the stable saddle path to reach the new steady
state, E2. In regard to the changes in the foreign assets, we can show the following.
Considering that n2 < nT , from (23d) it holds that b

2 > b

T . Figure 2(b) shows that
the level of the foreign asset decreases from E0 toward L and, thereafter, it increases
through L0. After the subsidy policy is removed at the point L0, the level of the
foreign asset increases from L0 to E2.26
Next, let us focus on the case of the export-income tax rate. As conrmed in
the last subsection, when the rate of the export-income tax increases, the _nt = 0
and the _at = 0 loci move downward. After the rate of the export-income tax policy
returns to its original level, the _nt = 0 locus returns to its original position, while
the _at = 0 locus will be located below its original position. Hence, after the initial
jump of the investment from E0 to I
0, the level of the natural resource increases
along the unstable path. However, after the rate of the export-income tax returns to
its original level, the level of the natural resource decreases over time. To the end,
the level of the natural resource in the new steady-state equilibrium shown by E2 is
lower than its original level in E0. In Figure 3, we can conrm the movement in the
foreign assets which correspond to the changes in the natural resource.
5 Discussion
In the last section, we obtained Proposition 2, which would be interesting beyond our
expectation because the temporary environmental policies always harm the renew-
above I, the economy would move upper right, which means that the economy would move along
the unstable path at any time. Therefore, the economy cannot follow the stable path at the period
T , implying that the economy cannot arrive at the steady state.
26Because the level of consumption decreases in the long run, from (B:1) it holds that b2 > b0
under G0 < 0.
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able natural resource. In this section, we further support the nding of Proposition
2 in two ways. First, we make use of the numerical examples to see the quantitative
impacts of environmental policies. Second, using the non-separable utility function
rather than the separable one (2), we suppose the more complicated inter-connection
between consumption and the natural resource.
5.1 Numerical examples
The purpose to use the numerical method is mainly to see the quantitative impacts of
environmental policies. In addition, our interest is to provide numerical conrmation
of our results in Proposition 2, and furthermore Figures 2 and 3 mathematically
correct.27
At rst, we specify the production functions and the utility functions. The pro-
duction of the single homogeneous good is represented by the production process
f(k) = 1k
 and the production function with the harvested natural resource is
h(zt) = 2z

t where 1 > 0, 2 > 0, 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1. The utility functions
are given by u(ct) = c
1 
t =(1  ) and v(nt) =  log(nt) where  > 0 and  > 0.
In the natural resource sector, following Brander and Taylor (1997) and Elasson
and Turnovsky (2004), we use the following reproduction function:
G(nt) = nt

1  nt
n

;  > 0: (30)
Finally, the investment function in the natural resource is specied as:
 (at) = 3a

t ; 3 > 0; 0 <  < 1: (31)
27We make use of Matlab 2014b.
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The parameters under our simulations are summarized as follows:
Production parameters:  = 0:3;  = 0:5; 1 = 2; 2 = 1:5:
Taste parameters:  = 1:75;  = 0:8;
Natural sectors parameters: n = 1:5;  = 0:5;  = 0:5; 3 = 0:2:
Price and tax rates: p = 1:25; a0 = 
y
0 = 0; r = ( =)0:15:
Initial values: b0 = 1; n0 = 1:407:
By setting  = 0:5 and n = 1:5, we have G0(0:75) = 0 and G00 =  1=n. In particular,
we assume that the natural resources moves in the range that G0 < 0, which means
that from Lemma1, the economy always satises the saddle-path stability. The price
p = 1:25 supposes the economy that the export good is more expensive than the
domestic one. Finally, the original rates of taxes are zero; instead, when the policy
changes, the tax rate is assumed to be a1 = 0:2 (or 
y
1 = 0:2).
Figures 4(a), 4(b) and 5 show the quantitative eects of the investment subsidy
and the export-income tax. Figure 4(a) depicts the permanent eect of the invest-
ment subsidy. Figure 4(b) depicts the temporary eect of the investment subsidy.
Figure 5 depicts the permanent and the temporary eects of the export-income tax.28
Furthermore, notice that the signs such as E0 and I in these gures are the same as
those in Figure 2 and 3; instead, the square shows the position of initial economy
and the sign (X) shows the end point of the economy.
First, it is shown that Figures 4(a), 4(b) and 5 are qualitatively the same as
Figures 2 and 3.
Second, we can conrm the main ndings in Proposition 2, that is, the level of
natural resource at the new steady state E2 is less than the original level at E0, which
means that the temporary increase in the rates of investment subsidy and the export-
income tax harms the renewable natural resource in the long run. Furthermore, we
can conrm the key downward jump of consumption that leads to Proposition 2.
28We divided into Figure 4(a) and 4(b) because the points E1 in Figure 4(a) and I
00 in Figure
4(b) are very close so that the readers may be confused. We used other parameter set; however,
this relationship was always seen.
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More concretely, the level of consumption jumps downward from c0 = 5:6907 to
c2 = 5:6903 in the case of investment subsidy, and from c

0 = 5:6907 to c

2 = 5:6514
in the case of export-income tax.
Finally, we can see the quantitative impacts of environmental policies. When
the rate of investment subsidy increases to a1 = 0:2, from Figures 4(a) and 4(b) we
can show that n1 = 1:443 and n

2 = 1:406. In particular, the temporary impact of
investment subsidy on the natural resource would be quantitatively small, that is,
the distance between n0 and n

2 is very close, which leads to the similar relationship
of the foreign assets, b0 = 1 and b

2 = 1:001. Even if the rate of investment subsidy
further increases to a1 = 0:5, each level of natural resource is given by n

0 = 1:407,
n1 = 1:478 and n

2 = 1:403. In the case of export-income tax, Figure 5 shows that
n0 = 1:407, n

1 = 1:468 and n

2 = 1:405 at 
y
1 = 0:2; instead, when 
y
1 = 0:5, we can
show that n1 = 1:499 and n

2 = 1:395.
5.2 Non-separable utility function
In the baseline model, we make use of the additive separable utility function given in
(2) for the tractability, which may be critical to obtain the main ndings. Therefore,
in this subsection we use a more general utility function as follows:
U [0] =
Z 1
0
u(ct; nt)e
 tdt: (32)
In this case, from the rst-order condition of consumption we can derive the
following:
ct = c(q; nt): (33)
Because the level of natural resource is not xed over time, the level of consumption
is not constant unlike the baseline model. However, importantly, the shadow value
for the foreign assets is still constant over time, that is, _qt=qt = 0 under r = .
Therefore, the extended model is the same as the baseline model in the sense that
the shadow value qt is constant along time.
We derive the dynamic equation of the investment in the natural resource as
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follows:
Non-separable utility:
_at
at
=    
0(at)
at 00(at)

r  G0(nt)  un(c(q; nt); nt) 
0(at)
(1  a)q

:
(34a)
We can see the constant shadow value q in (34a), which expects that when the
temporary shock arises, the new steady state does not coincide with the original
steady state where the dynamic equation of the renewable natural resource is identical
to (1). In particular, it may be useful to rewrite (9) as follows:
Separable utility:
_at
at
=    
0(at)
at 00(at)

r  G0(nt)  v
0(nt) 0(at)
(1  a)q

: (34b)
We can conrm that the dierence between (34a) and (34b) is un(c(q; nt); nt)
under the non-separable utility and v0(nt) under the separable utility. Therefore,
noting that v00(nt) < 0, the following assumption of decreasing marginal utility leads
to the qualitatively identical dynamic behavior of the investment in the natural
resource under the constant shadow value q:
@un(c(q; nt); nt)
@n
=
unc()2
ucc()

unn()ucc()
unc()2   1

(< 0): (35)
Note that the concavity of utility function leads to the negative sign of (35). There-
fore, our main ndings in Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 still hold. For instance, Fn
has a positive sign under (35), which leads to Lemma 1.29 That is, when ~n < n, the
steady-state equilibrium has the saddlepoint stability; instead, when ~n > n, we can
see the saddle-path stability under (18). Furthermore, following the similar proce-
dure in Appendix C, we can obtain Proposition 2 under (35), that is, the temporary
environmental policies always harm the renewable natural resource in the long run
if the marginal utility of the natural resource decreases in the natural resource.
29The slope of the _at = 0 locus is
dat
dnt

_at=0
=  FnFa :
Fn =
 0(a)
 00(a)

G00(n) +
@un(c(q; n
); n)
@n
(r  G0(n))
q

; Fa = r  G0(n);
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a dynamic model of a small open economy with a
renewable resource. Our main results are that when the rate of an investment subsidy
or an export-income tax temporarily increases, the level of the natural resource
always decreases in the long run. On the other hand, when permanent increases in
these policies are realized, the long-run eects of the environmental policies on the
natural resource can be positive. For instance, permanent increases in the investment
subsidy or export-income tax can increase the level of the natural resource when the
rate of investment subsidy or export-income tax is plausibly set.
We consider that the ndings in this paper have some important policy implica-
tions in this eld. Governments in developing countries are interested in conservation
of renewable resources; instead, they have not found the stylized environmental poli-
cies. In particular, the environmental policies conducted in Indonesia, Malaysia and
the Philippines did not lead to great results. Based on our ndings, the reason that
these policies was not successful lies in implementation term of environmental poli-
cies; that is, the short-term implementation of environmental policies does not bring
us any success in the long run; on the contrary, it harms the renewable resources. As
given in Proposition 1, when government sets the plausible rate of investment sub-
sidy or the export-income tax and permanently conducts the environmental policies,
the long-run level of renewable resource would increase.
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Derivation of (24a)  (24d):
Using equations (23a)  (23d), we derive (24a)  (24d).30 First, from (23b), we can
show that:
aj = (n

j ; 
a
j ; 
y
j ); (A.1)
where the respective derivatives are:
n 
@aj
@nj
=   G
0(nj)
 0(aj) 
@zj ()
@aj
> (<)0; if G0 < (>)0;
a 
@aj
@aj
=
@zj ()
@aj
 0(aj) 
@zj ()
@a
> 0;
y 
@aj
@ yj
=
@zj ()
@yj
 0(aj) 
@zj ()
@aj
< 0:
Next, substituting (A:1) into (23a) yields:
nj = N(c

j ; 
a
j ; 
y
j ); (A.2)
where we can show that:
Nc 
@nj
@cj
=
1
W
u00(cj)
u0(cj)
> 0;
Na 
@nj
@aj
=   1
W
 0(aj)
(1  aj )

 0(aj) 
@zj ()
@aj
 > 0;
Ny 
@nj
@ yj
=   1
W
 00(aj)
 0(aj)
yj > 0;
where W is:
W  G
00
r  G0  
 00
 0

 0   @z()
@a
 r   v0 0
(1  aj )u0
  v
00 0
v0 00

 0   @z()
@a

< 0: (A.3)
Note that, from (18), the sign of M takes a negative value.
30We consider that the initial time is time T in Appendix A. Thus, taking account of the initial
time zero rather than T , equations derived in Appendix A correspond to (24a)  (24d).
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Now, substituting (A:2) into (A:1) yields:
aj = (N(c

j ; 
a
j ; 
y
j ); 
a
j ; 
y
j )  A(cj ; aj ;  yj ); (A.4)
where:
Ac 
@aj
@cj
= nNc > (<)0; if G
0 < (>)0;
Aa 
@aj
@a
= nNa +a > 0; if G
0 < 0;
Ay 
@aj
@ y
= nNy +y < 0; if G
0 > 0:
Hence, equation (23c) can be rewritten as:
rbj + f(k) + ph(z

j (A(c

j ; 
a
j ; 
y
j ); 
a
j ; 
y
j )) = c

j + A(c

j ; 
a
j ; 
y
j ):
Then, we can obtain the following:
bj = B(c

j ; 
a
j ; 
y
j ): (A.5)
where each derivative is given by:
Bc 
@bj
@cj
=
1
r

Ac

1  ph0(zj )
zj ()
@aj

+ 1

; (A.6a)
Ba 
@bj
@aj
=
1
r

 ph0(zj )

Aa
@zj ()
@aj
+
@zj ()
@aj

+ Aa

; (A.6b)
By 
@bj
@ yj
=
1
r

 ph0(zj )

Ay
@zj ()
@aj
+
@zj ()
@ yj

+ Ay

: (A.6c)
Finally, substituting (A:5) and (A:2) into (23d) yields:
B(cj ; 
a
j ; 
y
j )  bTj = 
11

nTj  N(cj ;  aj ;  yj )
	
: (A.7)
Thus, consumption can be determined by:
cj = C(
a
j ; 
y
j ; bTj ; nTj); (A.8)
where we can show that:
Ca 
@cj
@aj
=  Ba + 
11Na
Bc + 
11Nc
< 0; (A.9a)
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Cy 
@cj
@ yj
=  By + 
11Ny
Bc + 
11Nc
< 0; (A.9b)
CbT 
@cj
@bTj
=
1
Bc + 
11Nc
> 0; (A.9c)
CnT 
@cj
@nTj
=

11
Bc + 
11Nc
> 0: (A.9d)
The sign of the denominator in (A:9a)  (A:9d) is positive:
Bc + 
11Nc
=
1
r
8<:1 Nc1  ph0 @z()@a 0   @z()
@a
0@G0    0
 00

G00 +
v00(r  G0)
v0
 r  0   @z()
@a

(r  G0   1)(r   1)
1A9=; ;
where Nc > 0.
Finally, using (23a), we can show that:
Bc +
11Nc
=
1
r
8<:1 Nc 1  ph0
@z()
@a
 0   @z()@a
0@r   v0 0
(1  a)u0  
 0
 00

G00 +
v00(r  G0)
v0
 r  0   @z()@a 
(r  G0   1)(r   1)
1A9=; > 0;
(A.10)
where we make use of the condition (25).
Appendix B.
Taking account of the initial jump in consumption, dierentiating (24a) with
respect to a yields:
@n
@a
= NcCa +Na ;
=
 NcBa +NaBc
Bc +1
1Nc
; (B.1)
where the sign of Bc + 1
1Nc is positive, as in (A:10). Arranging the numerator
on the right-hand side in (B:1) yields:
 NcBa +NaBc = 1
rW
 
 0   @z
@a
 u00
u0
@z
@a
(ph0 0   1)   
0
1  a

: (B.2)
Finally, making use of (10) and  y = 0, equation (B:2) can be rewritten as:
 NcBa +NaBc = 1
(1  a)rW   0   @z
@a
 h0u00
h00u0

a    
0u0h00
u00h0

: (B.3)
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This shows the relationship between n0 and n

1. Substituting (10) into the parenthesis
in (B:3) obtains the result in (26).
Next, we examine the eects of an increase in the rate of the export-income tax
on the natural resource. Conducting the static comparative analysis in (23b), we
obtain:
@n
@ y
= NcCy +Ny ;
=
( NcBy +NyBc)
Bc +1
1Nc
: (B.4)
The numerator on the right-hand side in (B:4) can be rewritten as:
 NcBy +NyBc = 1
rW
 
 0   @z
@a
 @z
@ y

u00
u0
(ph0 0   1)   
00
 0

: (B.5)
Then, substituting (10) and a = 0 into (B:5), we can show the eect of a permanent
increase in the rate of the export-income tax on the natural resource as follows:
(B:5) =
u00
rW
 
 0   @z
@a

u0
@z
@ y

 y
1   y  
 00u0
 0u00

: (B.6)
Appendix C.
In this appendix, we show the temporary impacts of the environmental policies
on the natural resource. Let us suppose that the government announces changes of
the policy instruments from the original levels a0 and 
y
0 to 
a
1 and 
y
1 until time T ,
which thereafter revert permanently to their original levels. Under the assumption
of perfect foresight, the households can initially anticipate the policy change at time
T . This implies that new information arrives only at time zero. Hence, consumption
jumps to the new steady state at the initial time zero and remains there permanently.
We divide the dynamics into two separate dynamics, Periods 1 and 2, as follows.
Period 1: 0  t < T
During Period 1, the economy moves along the unstable transitional path:
nt = n

1 +D1e
1t +D2e
2t; (C.1a)
at = a

1 +D11e
1t +D22e
2t; (C.1b)
bt = b

1  D1
11e1t  D2
22e2t; (C.1c)
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where 
2 is dened by
ph0(z) @z
()
@a  1
 2 : In addition, the steady-state levels of each
variable are determined by:
n1 = N(c

1; 
a
1 ; 
y
1 ) = N(C(
a
1 ; 
y
1 ; b0; n0); 
a
1 ; 
y
1 ); (C.2a)
a1 = A(c

1; 
a
1 ; 
y
1 ) = A(C(
a
1 ; 
y
1 ; b0; n0); 
a
1 ; 
y
1 ); (C.2b)
b1 = B(c

1; 
a
1 ; 
y
1 ) = B(C(
a
1 ; 
y
1 ; b0; n0); 
a
1 ; 
y
1 ); (C.2c)
c1 = C(
a
1 ; 
y
1 ; b0; n0): (C.2d)
Notice that the initial stocks of the natural resource and the foreign asset are n0 and
b0, respectively, and the rates of the investment subsidy and the export-income tax
are a1 and 
y
1 , respectively. Furthermore, we must note that c0 6= c1 because the
level of consumption jumps at the initial time.
Period 2: T  t
During Period 2, the economy follows the stable path dened by:31
nt = n

2 +D
0
1e
01t; (C.3a)
at = a

2 +D
0
11e
01t; (C.3b)
bt = b

2  D01
0101e
0
1t: (C.3c)
The steady-state levels of n2, a

2 and b

2 are determined by:
n2 = N(c

2; 
a
0 ; 
y
0 ) = N(C(
a
0 ; 
y
0 ; bT ; nT ); 
a
0 ; 
y
0 ); (C.4a)
a2 = A(c

2; 
a
0 ; 
y
0 ) = I(C(
a
0 ; 
y
0 ; bT ; nT ); 
a
0 ; 
y
0 ); (C.4b)
b2 = B(c

2; 
a
0 ; 
y
0 ) = B(C(
a
0 ; 
y
0 ; bT ; nT ); 
a
0 ; 
y
0 ); (C.4c)
c2 = C(
a
0 ; 
y
0 ; bT ; nT ): (C.4d)
Note that the level of consumption does not change c1 = c

2 because the household
anticipates the removal of the policy under the assumption of perfect foresight.
31Because the initial conditions are dierent in Period 1 and Period 2, the values of D1, 
1, 1
and 1 are dierent from D
0
1, 

0
1, 
0
1 and 
0
1; however, the fundamental forms and signs are the
same.
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For simplicity, let us denote the policy changes as follows:
a1   a0  da;  y1    y0  d y (C.5)
Furthermore, approximating the steady-state changes with the dierentials, we can
show that:
n2   n1  N(c2; a0 ;  y0 ) N(c1; a1 ;  y1 ) =  Nada  Nyd y; (C.6a)
n1   n0  N(c1; a1 ;  y1 ) N(c0; a0 ;  y0 ) = Nc (Cada + Cyd y) +Nada +Nyd y;
(C.6b)
a2   a1  A(c2; a0 ;  y0 )  I(c1; a1 ;  y1 ) =  Aada   Ayd y; (C.6c)
a1   a0  A(c1; a1 ;  y1 )  A(c0; a0 ;  y0 ) = Ac (Cada + Cyd y) + Aada + Ayd y:
(C.6d)
Please note that the equality c1 = c

2 holds.
Finally, from (C:6a) and (C:6b), we can characterize the eects of a temporary
policy change on the natural resource as follows:
n2   n0 = NcCada; n2   n0 = NcCyd y: (C.7)
where Nc > 0, C i < 0, and Cy < 0. The level of the natural resource in the new
steady state is lower than the original level when the rate of investment subsidy or
the export-income tax temporarily increases. Because the results in Proposition 2
are derived by only the steady-state dierences in (C:6a) and (C:6b), we must notice
that those are irrespective of the constants D1, D2 and D
0
1 which aect the movement
of variables along time.32
32We dene the constants D1, D2 and D
0
1 where we note that these constants are irrespective of
our main results in Proposition 2. By setting t = 0 in (C:1a) and (C:1b), these equations can be
rewritten as:
 (n1   n0) = D1 +D2;
Next, using (C:1a), (C:1b), (C:3a), and (C:3b) at t = T , the matching conditions on the natural
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Figure 1: Phase diagram
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Figure 2: The eects of an increase in the rate of the investment subsidy
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Figure 3: The eects of an increase in the rate of the export-income tax
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Figure 4(a): The investment subsidy
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Figure 4(b): The investment subsidy
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Figure 5: The export-income tax
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